2 version says that it is impossible for any state to be legitimate. Almost everyone finds this view implausible because a state seems perfectly legitimate when, for example, it efficiently and fairly promotes individual wellbeing and all those governed by it have given, under fair conditions, their free and informed consent to it. A weaker version of anarchism-moderate anarchismholds that a state is morally illegitimate unless all those governed by it have given appropriate consent. Relative to many theories of political morality-such as utilitarianism and (hypothetical) contractarianism-even this moderate version of anarchism is implausible. A version of utilitarianism, for example, can hold that a state is legitimate if it maximizes the total wellbeing in society (compared with other social arrangements). Consent and rights of selfdefense play no special role in this theory of political justification. Nozick, however, starts with a libertarian theory of individual rights in which consent and rights of self-defense play very significant roles. In the context of such a theory (which we will examine below), the moderate anarchist position seems quite compelling. Nozick, however, argues that even here it is mistaken.
He argues that the state can be legitimate even without unanimous consent. If his argument is successful, it is a very significant result.
Before considering Nozick's argument, we need to get clearer on what a state is and on his libertarian theory of justice.
The State
Defining statehood is no easy matter, and there is no uncontroversial comprehensive definition.
Something like the following, however, seems at least roughly right for our purposes: A state is a rule-of-law-based coercive organization that, for a given territory, effectively rules all individuals in it and claims a monopoly on the use of force (e.g., killing, maiming, or inflicting pain). This can be unpacked as follows: A state is a coercive organization in that it threatens to use force against 3 individuals who do not comply with its dictates (either via prior restraint to prevent non-compliance or via punishment or the extraction of compensation for non-compliance) and it generally implements its threats. A state is rule-of-law-based in that in general it uses force only for violation of public and proactive dictates (and not on the whim of its officials). A state effectively rules the individuals of a given territory in that those individuals generally obey its dictates. A state claims a monopoly on the use of force in that it prohibits the use of force (or credible threat thereof) without its permission.
The rule of law requirement is controversial, and, in any case, Nozick does not invoke it explicitly. He characterizes the state as a coercive organization that has, for a given territory, an effective monopoly on the use of force.
1 This is at least roughly equivalent to the definition given above, if we assume, as we shall, that (1) the rule of law requirement is either met or irrelevant, and (2) a coercive organization has an effective monopoly on the use of force in a given territory (roughly) if and only if it claims a monopoly on the use of the force in that territory and effectively rules that territory.
The (moderate) anarchist claim is thus that no coercive organization that exercises an effective monopoly on the use of force over a given territory is legitimate unless all those governed by it have consented to its rule. It is worth noting here that the claim concerns legitimacy-as opposed to authority. A state is legitimate just in case its use of force (and threat thereof) is typically morally permissible. A state has authority just in case individuals in its territory typically have at least an all-else-being-equal moral obligation to obey its dictates.
Ideally, a state should have both features, but in principle, a state could be legitimate even if it has no political authority (and vice-versa Nozick holds a kind of libertarian theory of justice, which we shall consider below. We shall start, however, by considering some more general aspects of his theory of justice. First, he holds that normal adult humans have certain strong natural rights-including the right to bodily integrity (which prohibits killing, torturing, or maiming the right-holder). These rights are natural in the sense that they do not depend on any legal or social conventions. All individuals having the requisite features-roughly, the ability to make free and rational choices in accordance with some reflectively chosen conception of the good life-have these rights. The rights are strong in the sense that they are not easily overridden by other moral considerations. Indeed, Nozick believes that these rights are nearly absolute: they may not be infringed except perhaps when necessary and effective in avoiding a great social catastrophe. Positing natural rights is not uncontroversial. Act-consequentialists (such as act-utilitarians) deny that there are any natural rights. Nonetheless, most people would acknowledge that there are some natural rights, and that the right to bodily integrity is among them.
A final general point to note about Nozick's theory of justice is that it is historical. What it is just to do depends in part on what happened in the past. It is not normally just to punch another in the face, but it may be if it is part of a consensual boxing match. Likewise, it is not normally just to lock someone in a room, but it may be so if that person murdered several people The right of initial acquisition is the power to acquire private property rights over things that are not already privately owned by others. Locke's version of this right requires that one "mix one's labor" with the thing and that one leave "enough and as good" for others. that the content and significance of the labor-mixing metaphor is not clear:
Does an astronaut who clears a plot on uninhabited Mars mix his labor with the plot, all of Mars, 7 or the entire uninhabited universe? Nozick never resolves this issue, but nothing significant is lost if we replace the labor-mixing requirement with the more general requirement that the individual stake a claim to the object in some appropriate manner (e.g., publicly declare/register that she is claiming ownership of the object). The crucial question concerns the other requirement, that "enough and as good" be left for others. Nozick calls this "the Lockean Proviso".
The Lockean Proviso can be interpreted in different ways. Nozick interprets it to require that the situation of others not be worsened by the appropriation. More exactly, he interprets it to require that no one be worse off in overall wellbeing with the appropriation than he/she would if the appropriation were not to take place (i.e., if the object were to remain in common use). Given that common use is generally inefficient (e.g., because individuals don't have sufficient incentives to preserve the resource), this interpretation of the proviso sets a low baseline and makes it relatively easy for individuals to acquire full private property in unappropriated things. 6 It's worth noting here that there is disagreement within libertarian theory concerning the right to appropriate unappropriated things. Extreme right-libertarianism denies that there is any kind of requirement that enough and as good be left for others. It holds, for example, that the first person to discover, claim, or mix labor with an unowned object can thereby fully own it.
Moderate (or Lockean) right-libertarianism holds that that some kind of Lockean Proviso must be satisfied, but interprets the proviso to be a weak requirement (e.g., as Nozick does Consider finally the fourth element in Nozick's libertarian theory of justice-the right of acquisition by transfer. The core idea is that if I have full property rights over a car (which includes the right to transfer these rights to others) and you and I each give our free and informed consent for those rights to be transferred to you, then those rights are transferred to you. Nozick emphasizes that justice depends in part on what contractual agreements have been made and thus that no purely end-state (i.e., non-historical) theory of justice can be adequate. He further claims (pp. 155-64) that the relevance of contractual agreements shows that no adequate theory of justice-even if historical-can be patterned in the sense of requiring (resources or wellbeing) to be distributed in accordance with some specified pattern of features. The pattern might, for example, be equality (which is not historical) or moral desert (which is historical, given that it requires that rewards match desert from past actions). We shall now briefly examine his famous Wilt Chamberlain argument for this claim.
Nozick asks us to consider a hypothetical case in which resources are distributed in accordance with our preferred pattern (e.g., equality or in proportion to moral merit) and Wilt
Chamberlain (a famous basketball star in the 1960s and early 1970s) signs a contract with his team according to which he gets 25 cents for each home-game ticket sold. Because he plays so well, the team owner freely agrees to this deal. At the end of the season, Wilt has earned an extra $250,000 and is much richer than everyone else. Nozick claims that such informed and free contractual agreements preserve justice in the sense that, if the original situation was just, then so is the situation that results from such agreements (and no other influences). Consequently, if we stipulate that there were no other relevant influences, the resulting situation must be just-given our assumption that the original one was. Justice, Nozick claims, is procedural: if one starts with a just situation and applies just steps, the result must be just. The crucial point here is that, given (according to Nozick) that transfers of rights in conformance with free and informed contracts are just steps, the resulting situation will generally not be in accordance with the specified pattern (e.g., equality or proportional to merit). Hence, contractual agreements-and the rights to transfer and to acquire by transfer that make them possible-are incompatible with a patterned theory of justice. Given that individuals surely have the right to engage in contractual agreements, no pattern can be maintained without unjustly restricting people's liberty. Thus, no patterned theory of justice is, he claims, plausible.
This is an important argument, but there are several ways of resisting the conclusion, and I shall mention two. First, if Wilt's initial earning power is significantly greater than that of others, the initial situation might include a very high head tax for him that would equalize opportunities for earnings 8 . Wilt would thus be free to earn lots of money playing basketball, but he would also have an enforceable duty to pay high taxes based on his earning power. This would be a kind of historical patterned principle (initial equality opportunity for earnings) in which contractual agreements preserve justice. It is not, however, the kind of patterned theory that Nozick was targeting, since it only imposes the pattern on the initial situation and not on later situations. A second way of resisting Nozick's conclusion is to note that he presupposes that
Wilt has full rights of acquisition by transfer, which preclude any taxation of transfers. One could, however, endorse less than full rights of acquisition by transfer, and these could make transfers subject to whatever taxation is necessary to preserve the specified pattern. In order for a dominant protection agency to be a state, it must have an effective monopoly on the use of force in its territory. This means that (1) it prohibits everyone in the territory from using force in ways that it has not authorized, and uses force against those who violate this dictate, (2) it is effective in getting individuals to comply with these prohibitions (e.g., they comply in part because it has so dictated), and (3) it is the only organization or individual that is effective in this way. The question is whether a dominant protection agency can have these features without violating anyone's rights. It's important to note that not everyone in the given territory need be a (fee-paying) client of the dominant protection agency. Some individuals may be clients of smaller protection agencies and some may not be clients of any protection agency. We must consider both the rights of those who are clients of the dominant protection agency and the rights of those who are not.
There will be no violation of the rights of clients, as long as their contracts with the protection agency require them to transfer all their enforcement rights to the agency. Indeed, such an arrangement will typically be efficient, since it will reduce retaliation and counter-retaliation between individuals. Clients, we may thus suppose, voluntarily give up their enforcement rights as part of the contract with their protection agency.
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The difficult case concerns the dominant protection agency's enforced prohibition against the use of non-authorized force against its clients by non-clients. Given that non-clients have not voluntarily given up their enforcement rights, this appears to be a violation of their rights. There is no problem when the protection agency uses force to stop a non-client from wrongly applying his enforcement rights against an innocent client. Here the non-client has no right to use force and is violating the client's rights. The problem arises when a non-client reliably and fairly applies appropriate force against a guilty client (e.g. to prevent a rights violation, to extract compensation, or punish, for one). Nozick claims that in a state of nature each individual has the right to use force to stop others from using unreliable or unfair enforcement mechanisms against herself. For example, I may use force to resist your attempt to forcibly extract compensation from me, or punish me, for a rights-violation that I did not commit. Moreover, I may also, in such a case, use force to resist being tried by a corrupt and biased jury that you hand-picked to assess whether I am guilty. If each client transfers this right to the dominant protection agency, then that agency may use force against anyone-even non-clients-who attempts to use unreliable or unfair enforcement mechanisms against its clients.
The net result is that, although the dominant protection agency does not claim any monopoly on the right to use force against those using unfair or unreliable enforcement mechanisms (since non-clients also have the same rights), only the dominant protection agency has the power to impose its own views on what is fair and reliable. It claims something close to a de facto monopoly on the use of force, even though it does not make any claim to a de jure (i.e., as a matter of right) monopoly. It prohibits everyone in the territory-clients and non-clientsfrom using force against its clients except in accordance with its own rules. 13 Moreover, because 13 the dominant protection agency effectively rules the territory, it has (and not merely claims) a something close to a de facto monopoly on the use of force.
Nozick argues that the dominant protection agency is not yet a state, but it can naturally evolve into one. It is not a state, he claims, because it does not protect everyone in its territory. This is because not everyone need be a client of the dominant protection agency, and those who are not clients are not protected. It's not clear to me that a coercive organization needs to protect all in a given territory in order to be a state. The crucial problem concerns who counts as part of the "all". Many historical "states" have offered minimal protection to slaves and women. Of course, most have offered at least some protection, but, even if they offered no protection, they would still seem to be states (although illegitimate ones). For the sake of argument, however, let us grant this requirement and consider how Nozick believes it will be met.
The crucial issue for Nozick concerns the justness of the dominant protection agency prohibiting-with a threat of force-non-clients from using enforcement procedures, which the agency has not authorized, against clients. There is no problem with prohibiting them from using procedures that will definitely violate the rights of clients. The problem arises when the prohibited enforcement procedure is merely risky in the sense that there is a less than certain chance that it will result in injustice. Nozick has an extremely interesting and important discussion of the issues that arise in this case, but we shall have to limit ourselves to the big picture. He argues roughly that it is permissible to prohibit risky activities where those activities would generate a general fear in the population even if it were known that compensation would always be provided to those whose rights were violated. The crucial point here is that he further argues that, if a protection agency prohibits non-clients from using risky enforcement procedures, it must compensate them for any disadvantage this imposes. This is what he calls "the Principle of Compensation" (p. 82). The cheapest and most effective way of providing this 14 compensation is to provide protection services to the non-clients at a reduced price (reduced by the amount of compensation owed). Of course, the non-clients are free to decline those services, but given that those services also protect them against other non-clients, there will be a strong tendency to accept the protective services.
14 Thus, something approaching universal protection will be achieved by the dominant protection agency. The dominant protection agency will be a state. Nozick argues that the dominant protection agency violates no one's rights when it prohibits-and uses force to stop-non-clients from using enforcement procedures that it deems unfair or unreliable (provided that it provides appropriate compensation). I shall now argue that is not so. violate no one's rights in using them. Is Nozick correct that the dominant protection agency does not violate my rights if it prohibits me-as a non-client-from using these procedures, as long as appropriate compensation is paid? I claim that he is mistaken on this issue.
According to , the crucial issue is whether the dominant protection agency has enough information about my enforcement procedure to establish that it is reliable and fair. If it does, then, Nozick rightly claims, it may not prohibit my use of it. Nozick further claims, however, that the dominant protection agency may prohibit my enforcement procedure when the agency does not have enough information to establish that it is reliable and fair. This seems mistaken. Suppose that my enforcement procedure is reliable and fair and that I am in fact applying it appropriately against a guilty party (e.g., as in the above examples). The dominant protection agency will not deem my enforcement procedure reliable and fair (e.g., because of lack of information), but in this case it is. I am fully within my rights to use them, and the agency violates my rights if it uses force against me in response to my doing so. This remains true even if I am compensated for such interference. Of course, as Nozick emphasizes, the protection agency has to act on the basis of its own judgements, and thus, if it deems my enforcement procedures unreliable or unfair, it will deem it morally permissible for it to use of force in response to it. The crucial point is that the agency may be mistaken, and, where it is, it violates the rights of those whose just enforcement procedures it prohibits-even if compensation is paid.
In sum, the crucial question that Nozick addresses is how a state could be legitimate without the consent of all of those it governs. The crucial move that Nozick makes to answer this question is that, prior to any contractual agreements, each individual is permitted (as long as appropriate compensation is paid) to use force to stop others from using enforcement procedures that he/she deems unfair or unreliable. Where there is a single dominant protection agency representing individuals, it is also so permitted on behalf of its clients. I have suggested,
however, that Nozick is mistaken that individuals and protection agencies violate no rights when they mistakenly use force to stop someone from using an enforcement procedure that is in fact fair and reliable. If this is so, Nozick's argument for the possibility of a state arising without the consent of all and without violating rights succeeds only if the dominant protection agency approves of all enforcement procedures that are in fact reliable and fair. Given the limitations of human knowledge, this is extremely unlikely. It could happen by chance, but it is not practically possible in the sense that we could reasonably ensure that it is so.
Not all is lost, however. merely that everyone has an adequate opportunity to obtain the most basic nutrition, shelter, and health care. Such aid might, for example, be provided to young orphans and those severely disabled through no fault of their own. Right-libertarianism rejects even such minimal taxation for meeting the very basic needs of others, but most people think that some such taxation is legitimate.
The most controversial right-libertarian claim in this context is the claim that it is illegitimate for the state to provide goods and services that benefit everyone and that the market does not provide efficiently or effectively. Of course, there is much controversy about which goods can be provided effectively by the market and about the role of the state in providing those that are not so provided. Most people, however, would agree that it is legitimate to provide goods and services that make everyone better off than he/she would be without state provision. Rightlibertarianism, however, denies the legitimacy of such a role for the state.
It is important to note that the state can require citizens to provide aid for the above kinds of activities in two distinct ways. One is to require citizens to provide personal services (e.g., 20 serve in the military or serve on a jury). The other is to require citizens to contribute money or other external resources (e.g., to pay for the military or court services). Right-libertarianism is on its firmest ground when it rejects the legitimacy of the state requiring personal services for the above activities and on its weakest ground when it rejects the legitimacy of the state requiring the payment of taxes to fund the above activities. The personal freedom and security of full selfownership is much easier to defend than the freedom from taxation provided by full property rights in external things.
Putting all this together, we can say that right-libertarianism is on relatively firm ground in its rejection of the legitimacy of (1) any state requirement to provide personal services to promote a purely impersonal good, and (2) any state prohibition of activities that do not violate the rights or otherwise harm others. Right-libertarianism is, however, on relative weak ground in its rejection of the legitimacy of state taxation to (1) provide for the very basic needs of the most vulnerable members of society (e.g., children and the severely disabled), and (2) make everyone's life better by providing goods and services that the market does not provide effectively.
In sum, right-libertarianism may be right that individuals fully own themselves and thus that it is illegitimate for the state to limit their freedom by requiring them to provide personal services for the above kinds of state activities. Right-libertarianism's view that individuals can acquire full private property in external things-which rules out any taxation-is much more controversial. Almost everyone agree that individuals can acquire robust private property in external things, but most would reject the view that such rights are so strong that they preclude all forms of taxation. If this view is correct, then more than the minimal night-watchman state is legitimate.
6. Conclusion
Nozick's defense of the possibility of the legitimacy of the state assumes the rights of full selfownership (including enforcement rights). This makes Nozick's task particularly difficult, and establishing the possibility of a legitimate state from such a starting point would be a significant result. Nozick's defense of the impossibility of the legitimacy of any state more extensive than the night-watchman state without the consent of all governed, however, assumes rightlibertarianism's commitment to full property rights in external things, and this makes Nozick's task particularly easy. It rules out the possibility that individuals have an enforceable duty to pay any taxes to promote any social goals. Given that this view is subject to powerful objections, the significance of the second argument is very limited.
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